



**TEMATICA pentru examenul de
ADMITERE la DOCTORAT domeniul FINANTE
sesiunea 2024**

Chapter I. Microeconomics of Banking

- 1.1 The lender-borrower relationship
- 1.2 Equilibrium in the credit market and its macroeconomic implications
- 1.3 Risk management in banking
- 1.4 The regulation of banks
- 1.5 Individual bank runs
- 1.6 Network models

Chapter II. Microeconometrics of Banking

- 2.1 Determinants of characteristics of bank relationships
- 2.2 The impact of borders, mergers, and acquisitions
- 2.3 Determinants and implications of banking crisis
- 2.4 Regulation and financial stability
- 2.5 Value at Risk models
- 2.6 Systemic risk models

Chapter III. Financial Modelling with Python and Stata (Applications in Banking)

- 3.1 Mathematical techniques with NumPy, SciPy and SymPy such as regression and optimization
- 3.2 Stochastics for Monte Carlo simulation, Value-at-Risk, and Credit-Value-at-Risk calculations
- 3.3 Statistics for normality tests, mean-variance portfolio optimization, principal component analysis, and Bayesian regression
- 3.4 Linear regression with heteroskedastic errors, Conditional logistic regression, Multiple-outcome qualitative dependent-variable models; Panel-data models
- 3.5 Models with endogenous sample selection; Models with time-series data
Survival-time (failure-time) models; Treatment-effect models; Generalized method of moments
- 3.6 Event study methodology

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